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Tax incentives applied against externalities: international examples for the public health 
product tax and the carbon tax 
 
This study assesses in practice the Pigou taxes introduced as a response to negative 
externalities. We will assess the international practice and effectiveness of two areas, the 
taxation of food products harmful to health and that of carbon emission, harmful to the 
sustainable environment. We focus on the opportunities and the efficiency-reducing factors of 
these two tax types. 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic thinking discovered relatively early that one of the sources of the imperfectness of 
the market is that economic transactions affect not only the participants, but also others, either 
favourably or adversely. Marshall (1820) describes this effect by the concept of external costs 
and external economy. The theories generally focus on negative externalities, i.e. those 
unintended and undesirable costs and adverse impacts that derive from economic activity and 
affect parties not involved in it. According to Mátyás (1999), Pigou (1920) enhances the 
external economy model of Marshall and distinguishes between the private and social 
marginal productivity and marginal cost of an economic transaction. By this pair of concept 
we can describe the negative externality: The marginal productivity of an economic activity is 
bigger than its social one, and its private marginal productivity is smaller than its social one. 
As is implied from the theoretical introduction of Kerekes (1990), it is the quite tangible, 
material pollution that is the first and most common in analyses of the professional literature.  
The question is how the additional cost of the society can be made the private costs of the 
individual who incurred it.  The answer is very simple: the loser, i.e. the party who sustained 
the damages, must be compensated from the profit gained. Pigou (1920) provided a seemingly 
very simple solution for this: The cost of society must be turned into a cost, in the form of tax, 
on the party who caused the damage or losses. Coase (1969) strongly disputes this approach, 
stating that if we increase the marginal cost by the tax and thereby restrict the party who 
caused the loss, then it will lose the profit because of the activity not performed by it. For that 
reason, Coase proposes that instead of levying a tax, the title to the vulnerable resource must 
be assigned to a party who sustains the damage and is willing to price it. That way the 
externality is priced at a market rate, as a cost on the party who created it.  
It has been assessed from the aspect of microeconomics as well, why negative externalities do 
not disappear by themselves. Economics supposes a rational consumer whose purpose is to 
maximize their utility (Varian 2005). According to the generally accepted economic model, 
consumers are rational, but in reality they do not possess all information, do not know all 
consequences and possibilities, so they may not even recognize the problem. According to 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), as opposed to the general opinion of economics, their 
decisions and preferences are inconsistent in time: at a given moment their welfare at two 
points of time in the future is equally important, at the same time, when they reach the earlier, 
first such point of time, their welfare experienced at the given moment becomes much more 
important for them than their welfare at the next point of time (although at a point of time 
earlier than both, both had been equally important). In other words, the instant utilities 
become much more important than the future ones, i.e. economic participants discount their 
long-term benefits and costs more strongly. (Varian 2005) The adverse health and 
environment impacts assessed by us occur in the long term, while the customers and producer 
benefits in the short term. That is why some kind of regulatory intervention is necessary in 
their case.  
In the following part we will analyze two ways for the practical implementation of the Pigou 
tax.1 The taxation of CO2 emission is related to the well-known problem of environment 
pollution, as the presumed source of global warming, which changes the climate and by that, 
transforms the economic and living opportunities in a geographical sense. The other area of 
taxation that we have assessed is the internalization of social costs deriving from 
inappropriate lifestyle, a concept considered more novel, through the popular health product 
tax (fat tax). Although these topics are far from each other in technical and industrial terms, 
but in terms of economic problem and impact analysis there are many factors justifying a 
similar treatment of the fat tax and the carbon tax. Both of these text types are intended to 
charge social costs (negative externalities) on the party causing the cost. All that is based on 
the price sensitivity (price elasticity) of the consumer or the producer. However, in reality 
there are several factors that prevent this price effect from playing out, in the case of both the 
food industry and the polluting activities. Another factor that also causes difficulties in the 
mitigation of negative effects in both areas is that those discoveries of natural science that 
implicate the individual foods in the incurrence of health costs and carbon dioxide emission in 
global warming are part of the prevailing scientific discourse, but there are still scientific 
debate is going on about whether these assumptions are justified. Therefore, from the aspect 
of taxation the justification for levying the tax can be disputed. Furthermore, an economic 
policy applying this to tax types must also anticipate other short and medium-term economic 
opportunity costs. What will be the effects on welfare and income if foods currently 
consumed in a great volume and considered fundamental are made more expensive or if the 
costs of the processing industry are raised? Furthermore, if the tax eliminates not only the 
negative externalities, but together with them the tax base as well, will it harm the general 
government funding? Such dilemmas also cause uncertainty in the economic policymakers 
who levied the taxes, as a result, the roles and weights of the two assessed tax types may 
remain marginal. As can be inferred from the analysis of Takács et al. (2014), the application 
of tax incentives is a marginal tool in the European taxation trends, although according to the 
assessment of Pesuth (2014), in the 2010s the need for equitable and fair taxation increased, 
which is an important principle for the acceptable public sharing of external social costs.   
 
2. The nature of the Pigou tax 
The tax proposal of Pigou (1920) was developed after realizing that the market is not capable 
of internalizing the undesirable social costs in the case of certain economic activities. The 
Pigou tax may be levied on market activities that result in negative externalities. The purpose 
of the tax is to adjust the outcome of the economic activity. In this approach the externalities 
divert the economy from its Pareto efficient state, while the appropriate tax restores the Pareto 
optimal state. The tax burden must be the same as the incremental marginal cost caused by the 
externalities. This is where the economic challenge lies. Is economic policy capable of 
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determining the rate of the tax accurately, in order to trigger the desired effect? Wrong tax 
rates, institutional failures in legislation and implementation, political lobbies, the granting of 
exceptions negate the effect of the Pigou tax. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the Pigou tax, which - similarly to any levied tax in general - 
increases the prices of the goods of the production creating the externalities and reduces the 
demand for them, depending on the price elasticity of supply and demand. Naturally, parallel 
with that, unrealized consumption or procurement will result in lost profit, which is realized 
as deadweight loss. (Varian, 2005). However, the ease by which a Pigou tax can be levied 
also makes it vulnerable. For example, the application of this tax disregards the intensity of 
market competition. Is the chips tax going to be incorporated into the product prices of the 
multinational retail chain stores, or the entire burden will be charged on the producer 
companies? Is it possible that a freight shipping company is able to pass on the tax paid on 
CO2 emission to the same extent on its customers as a steel factory can? The equilibrium 
prices of a competitive market and that of a monopoly are different, which would justify the 
implementation of different tax rates if the aim is to reduce the externality. Buchanan (1969) 
highlights the monopoly of oil exporters and the inelasticity of demand as an example. Edlin 
and Karaca-Mandic (2006) highlight the different externality volumes owing to technological 
heterogeneity and the elasticity of demand/supply, which make the calculation of the optimal 
tax rate uncertain. 
 
Figure 1 impact of the Pigou tax on the externality 
 
Source: Nye (2008). Note: Qpt = output with the tax burden, Q = output without the tax 
burden, HTV = deadweight loss 
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It is also questionable how the deadweight loss indicated on Figure 1 (HTV) compares to the 
saved social costs. This is also dependent on the price elasticities. In the case of taxes we 
should never forget the importance of budget revenues. It is not uncommon that legislators 
start to increase the rate of an implemented tax owing to the hunger of the public finances for 
revenue. This is the typical behaviour of excise duties, (also) owing to the price inelasticity of 
demand. The anticipations concerning future tax hikes could even increase the activity 
causing the negative externality in the present, despite the intention of the politicians 
imposing the tax, since it is anticipated that these goods will become more expensive in the 
future. (E.g. see the green tax paradox of Sinn (2008), which was, however, empirically 
refuted by Edenhofer and Kalkuhl (2011).) In terms of social costs it is the advantage of the 
Pigou taxes that they reduce social marginal costs through two channels simultaneously. On 
the one hand, they finance the social costs by tax revenues, on the other hand, depending on 
price elasticity, they attempt to discourage negative externalities. This latter means in our 
example that the appropriate taxes encourage the persons causing social costs for lifestyle 
changes, owing to a diet causing health risks, and for technological adaptation owing to the 
emission of carbon dioxide causing climate change. 
It is an important feature and weak point of the Pigou tax that it serves two conflicting 
purposes. On the one hand, it is designed to reduce negative externalities, on the other hand, 
as a tax, to secure government revenues. In practice, a spending opportunity will be found for 
every bit of additional tax revenue, therefore it would be naive to suppose that the only 
function of any Pigou tax applied in practice would be to “re-educate” the society. The 
operating mechanism of the trade-off between the externality and the budget revenue is the 
following: If the externality cannot be reduced, then the tax revenue will be sustainable and 
naturally, the social cost will not be eliminated. If, on the other hand, the externality can be 
reduced, then the tax base and the tax revenue built on it will be eliminated. This latter case 
can be mitigated by raising the tax rates, which could naturally reduce the tax base even more 
efficiently. 
 
3. International experiences with the popular health product tax (NETA)2  
3.1. The economic basis of NETA 
The health hazards of foodstuffs and the welfare costs of these, furthermore, the national level 
working capacity problems arising from diseases motivated the policymakers to take certain 
influencing steps in the field of nutrition as well. This is not easy for a number of reasons, 
including the fact that significant industries are built on the mass manufacturing of products 
made from sugar, starch, trans fats and other ingredients considered harmful. Health policy 
has two options to influence the consumers: education and incorporating the risks in the prices 
of foodstuffs by the popular health product tax (fat tax in English, commonly called chips tax 
in Hungary). Practical experiences imply that educational campaigns aimed at consumers are 
insufficient concerning the health effects. In the opinion of Kuchler et al. (2004) and 
Philipson and Posner (1999) it is not necessarily true that a rational consumer should live a 
healthy lifestyle. Brownell et al. (2009) raises the point that a significant part of people may 
not be really aware of the consequences of the consumption of certain nutrients in large 
quantities, that way, what causes the market failure is the fact that consumers have incomplete 
information and appreciate present, instant utilities more, which is especially true for children 
and young people. Concerning utilities, Lusk and Schroeter (2012), who treated the ideal 
weight of the people as one of the elements of their utility, have come to the conclusion that 
NETA may increase the welfare of the consumer if the amount they are willing to pay for one 
unit of loss of excess weight is higher than the ratio between the amount paid for taxable 
products and the excess weight lost as a result of the tax. 
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By modelling the soda tax, a tax originally levied on carbonated refreshments, Dolan (2010) 
demonstrated that NETA may reduce the volume of products sold by the food industry. If we 
take into account that according to Jensen and Smed (2007) the consumers of the food 
industry are generally price-sensitive, then this statement may be applicable to the entire food 
industry. Price sensitivity can be used to force a healthy diet in such a manner that the prices 
of more harmful foodstuffs are distorted by taxes. 
On the other hand, Clark and Dittrich (2010) indicate the problem arising from the complexity 
of foodstuffs, who argue that it would be wrong to treat NETA in the same way as, for 
example, the excise duty levied on tobacco. The main difference is that in the case of the 
tobacco tax only those consumers pay the tax who smoke, on the number of cigarettes 
smoked. The tax serves its purpose, since in the case of smoking the relationship between the 
cause (the smoked cigarettes) and the effect (diseases caused by the smoked cigarettes) is 
clear. At the same time, in the case of NETA the relationship between the given nutrient (for 
example: fat) and the consequence (obesity) is less clear at scientific level. On the one hand, it 
is not certain that in the case of the given consumer the problems are caused by the 
consumption of a given quantity of fat (since they might not get enough exercise or consume 
excess sugar, rather than excess fat), on the other hand, the tax is also levied on persons who 
do not experience the consequence (obesity). (Clark – Dittrich 2010) In addition, going off a 
harmful addiction may involve taking up another. For example, it is quite frequent that ex-
smokers become obese owing to the change in the processes in their bodies and displacement 
activities. (Philipson – Posner 1999) 
Obesity is both a demand and supply-related problem of the market of calories available in the 
form of foodstuffs. (Philipson – Posner 1999) If we assess foods as consumer goods, their 
costs is made up of two items: the costs of the base materials and the time costs necessary for 
preparation and consumption. The costs of the utilization, i.e. burning of the calories varies 
individually. If someone does manual work, their calorie burning time cost will be lower, 
because it happens during working hours. On the other hand, for a white collar worker 
burning calories is relatively expensive, because they have to devote some of their free time to 
exercising. Similarly, the higher an intellectual worker gets paid, the higher the alternative 
cost of calorie burning is, since he could do some work instead of exercising (Muriel 2008). 
 
3.2. The practical implementation of NETA 
In certain countries NETA is not levied separately, rather it is incorporated in the VAT. In 
several countries (such as Canada, the United Kingdom, France) foodstuffs are basically 
subject to zero VAT, except some sectors (such as soft drinks or sweets, see Leicester – 
Windmeijer 2004).  This method is not transparent for the consumer and leaves little room for 
the fine-tuning of taxation. This type of taxation is not equitable, also because even within one 
tax regime in the food market the content of harmful ingredients of the individual products 
varies significantly, thus taxation by the same rate is capable of shifting customers behaviour 
towards products with a lower content of harmful substances. 
Clark and Dittrich (2010) identified the following forms of implementation:  
(1) Composite Commodity Fat Tax (CCFT): The „composite” part of the acronym refers to 
the food group. In this version an entire food group is taxed because of an ingredient that is 
considered unhealthy, on the basis of the characteristic average fat content of the food group. 
This scenario is criticized because the tax does not change, orient the mindset of the 
consumers. For instance, it may happen that as a result of a tax levied evenly on an entire food 
group, the consumers will opt for a product with higher fat content with price (A), as opposed 
to the product with a lower fat content consumed before, with price (A+x, A;x>0), since the 
price of (A+x+t) is no longer acceptable for them as a result of the tax (t), as opposed to the 
price of (A+t). The authors also highlight that the only benefit of this tax is low administrative 
costs. 
(2) Nutrient tax (NFT): This tax is levied on every type of food, depending on their fat 
content. That is, it would not use “food groups”, the only characteristic it takes into account is 
the fat content of the given food. The weak point of this tax version is that it disregards the 
causal relationship between obesity and nutrients: the reason cannot only be fat, but also, for 
example, sugar, thus the "restriction” (discouragement) may result in the increase of the 
consumption of the other base material (sugar) several times over if it is not restricted by 
taxes. 
(3) Nutrition Index Fat Tax (NIFT): NFT responded to the problem that was the main 
deficiency of CCFT: instead of food groups and generalization it made taxation dependent on 
the specific composition of a given product. Yet another model, NIFT is intended to resolve 
the main deficiency of NFT: it takes into account the fact that obesity is not the result of a 
specific nutrient, rather the complex relations of mutually substitutable nutrients. 
The essence of NIFT is that it takes into account the impact arising from the ratios and 
relations of the ingredients of the given food on obesity, which is assessed by an index and it 
is the index that is taxed. The index would represent the marginal impact of the individual 
components, thus the consumer would see a product with proportionately increased price in 
the case of substitution as well. In addition, if the marginal impact of the given food is 
positive, i.e. the food is useful for the human body, its sale could be subsidized. There are two 
methodological difficulties concerning such an index: On the one hand, the marginal impact 
of a food on health depends on the age and other characteristics of the individual. On the other 
hand, just because someone buya something, they are not sure to actually eat every element of 
it. Therefore, it is difficult to regulate by tax a complex set of problems in a perfect and 
sophisticated manner. Let us review the international experiences. 
Denmark has been the first country in the world where a tax was introduced on saturated fatty 
acids in October 2011. Among others, such products were targeted by the tax as margarine, 
meat or daily products. (Abend 2011) Denmark is a unique example, not only because this 
was the first country, but also because here NETA was not introduced because of the high 
ratio of overweight persons. In Denmark 42.9% of the population belong to the overweight 
(12.9%) or obese (29.9%) categories, which can be considered a below average result 
compared to other OECD countries (OECD, 2013). NETA was introduced in Denmark 
because the country lost several positions in the country ranking of life expectancy. In 
response, the leaders of the country set up a “Prevention Committee”, with the purpose of 
extending life expectancy by several years. At the same time, the revenue increasing effect 
could also play out, since Denmark also attempted to use the introduced tax as compensation 
for revenues lost through the personal income tax. (Jensen and Smed, 2012) 
In total, if we assess this aim, the “extension of life expectancy” can certainly be considered a 
superior aim: it goes beyond reducing the number of overweight persons - it was meant to 
bring about an improvement in quality of life. Reducing the number of overweight persons is 
just one way to accomplish higher quality of life and longer life expectancy. The levying of 
this tax had been preceded by lots of debates and changes. According to the first plans meat 
and milk would have been tax-exempt, but since it was challenged by several parties, 
including the European Commission, after a review these were also made subject to the tax 
law. According to experts it would have been a mistake to leave out meat and milk. The main 
problem with meat was that it presented a difficult methodological problem to define the tax 
payable on meat fairly. There were two options: 1.) using special scales it is possible to 
determine the exact fat content of a slice of meat, and this will be the tax base; 2) the tax is 
payable according to the average data characteristic of the given type of meat (Smed 2012). 
Finally, the tax was abolished in 2012, one year after its introduction (The Economist 2012). 
Experts debate a lot on whether or not it was effective. According to optimistic opinions, the 
consumption of saturated fatty acids decreased by 4%, therefore it would be wrong to claim 
that the tax did not work (Bosoley 2013). Experts claim that the failure of NETA in Denmark 
does not mean that these taxes are not effective, since Denmark is a special place from many 
aspects: the country is small and it is very easy to cross the border for some shopping (Frum 
2013). 
Finland imposed an excise duty on the confectionery industry in 2011, the purpose of the tax 
was to reduce consumption and improve popular health. Two years after its introduction, in 
2013 the statistics showed that the effect of the tax was negligible - after an initial decrease in 
consumption, it returned nearly to its former level - one citizen of Finland consumes 200 
grams of chocolate per week on average. At an annual level the tax generated a sales revenue 
of EUR 78 million (Yle 2013). In addition to chocolate, ice cream is also taxable in Finland, 
since the country shows the highest consumption level of ice cream in the world. A high level 
of tax, 30-40% on average (0.75 euros/kg) applies to this high ice cream consumption (Stone 
2013). Originally imposed on chocolate and ice cream only, the tax was later also levied on 
crackers, and a team is working on changing the logic of taxation: the new concept would 
require payment on sugar contents, and not on product groups. This would be beneficial 
because it would make such products taxable as yoghurt with sugar content or fine bakery 
ware (Repo 2012). 
Similarly to the Finns, Norway also imposed an excise duty on sugar, products containing 
added sugar and chocolate (Deloitte 2011). It is interesting to note that the “chocolate tax” 
was introduced in Norway back in 1922 - the purpose was not the promotion of healthy 
eating, rather the taxation of luxury goods (AmCham Norway 2007). 
Mexico is on top of the list among OECD countries in terms of obesity: only 30.5% of the 
population have a body mass index lower than the limit considered healthy, while 69.5% 
belong to the overweight (30%) or obese (39.5% group.)  (OECD, 2013) In order to curb this 
problem and increase tax revenues, in 2013 the legislation adopted taxes payable on products 
with high calorie content, including soft drinks, sweets and candies, potato chips and products 
containing sugary cereals (Villegas 2013). Prior to the introduction of this tax Mexico had 
analyzed what would be the potential harm caused to the economy by the decrease of sales in 
the affected industries, but they had come to the conclusion that this loss of sales would be 
much lower than the damage that could be caused to the country within 10 years by the 
increase of obesity (Bosoley 2013). 
To sum up the experiences, assessment of NETA is not a simple task. On the one hand, it was 
introduced in a small number of countries, and where it was, introduction of the tax happened 
only a few years ago, and this period is not long enough to draw the appropriate conclusions. 
The available research findings all relate to the various segments of the food industries of 
various countries (Thow et al. 2010). 
In fact, NETA tries to influence the consumer through price. According to Slutsky’s equation, 
the change in demand in the case of a price change is composed of two effects, (i) the 
substitution effect and the (ii) income effect. According to (Varian 2005)3 Eyles et al. (2012) it 
especially applies to the food industry that when the price of something goes up, the 
consumers start purchasing substitute products - which are often just as unhealthy as the 
originally consumed product.4 
After assessing several tax types, Clark and Dittrich (2010) arrived at the conclusion that the 
main problem is that the applied taxes disregard the following: 
1) interactions, relations among nutrients found in individual foodstuffs (for example, 
products with low fat but high sugar content),  
2) individual factors causing obesity and determining nutrient needs (age, gender, body 
composition), 
3) interactions, substitutions among food groups (for example, when someone switches from 
chocolate to sugary dairy products), 
4) just because a nutrient is part of the product upon purchase, the consumer is not certain to 
actually eat it (for example, fat is removed from the meat before cooking). 
In the case of NETA, in addition to assessment of the product’s own price elasticity, the 
assessment of cross-price elasticity is also important prior to the introduction of the tax. In 
many cases what causes the biggest problem is not NETA’s inability to reduce the 
consumption of a product, since the consumers are basically price-sensitive, rather the high 
number of substitution options by other food industrial products. According to an impact 
study, if the tax was levied on saturated fatty acids in the United Kingdom, this would have 
the effect of slightly increasing the consumption of salt, which is also harmful to health 
(Mytton et al. 2007). 
One of the most comprehensive studies on the price elasticities typical of the food industry 
has been prepared by Andreyeva et al. (2010): In 2010, based on a study and research 
published in the US on price elasticity in the food industry, foodstuffs were assigned to 16 
groups and the average price elasticity of each group was determined. The result was 
surprising: the price of each category is inelastic, it was below 1. 
Chouinard et al. (2007) assessed the market of dairy products in the US. Milk is an excellent 
example of a food concerning which it is uncertain whether society considers or 
acknowledges it as a harmful product or not. It was primarily its fat content and not its lactose 
content why it was made subject to the taxes that we have cited. Returning to the analysis of 
the American dairy market, the results show that the demand of households for dairy products 
is relatively inelastic, that way a tax of 10% could generate a high revenue easily. According 
to their calculations, the welfare loss of the consumers and the amount of NETA paid would 
be nearly identical, at an annual level it would mean 4.45 billion USD. At the same time, 
consumption would only decrease by 1%.  The analysis of Allais et al. (2010) demonstrates 
that NETA is not capable of significantly influencing the nutrient intake of households and its 
impacts are not clear. According to the research of Eyles et al. (2012), in the case of soft 
drinks with high carbohydrate (sugar) content, a price raise of 1% would decrease 
consumption by 0.93%. According to their results, in the case of a price raised by 1% the 
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energy taken into the body by saturated fatty acids would decrease by 0.02%. According to 
their analyses, a decrease of 1% in the price of fruits and vegetables would result in a demand 
increase of 0.35%. On the other hand, according to Kotakorpi et al. (2011) in Finland the 
demand for products with sugar content is elastic, and they proposed that a "sugar tax" of 
€1/kilogram should be levied, which could significantly decrease the number of diabetics in 
Finland. According to Putnam et al. (2002), people do not like the flavour of low-fat 
substitutions. According to research, those NETAs that only tax high sugar or high fat content 
often result in negative externalities. Specifically, the decrease of fat consumption results in 
the increase of sugar consumption, and vice versa.  Chouinard et al. (2007) highlights that the 
tax will not only result in the exact opposite of its intended purpose (people start eating more 
sugar and fat), but could also reduce the welfare of the consumer. 
The introduction of NETA as a step in tax policy starts from the assumption that in the case of 
food purchases the decision is strongly determined by the price, therefore a higher price 
means discouragement (PHEIAC 2013). At the same time, if we want to raise the price 
optimally, we must know the cross-price elasticities and the demand changing as a result of 
the tax, which are almost impossible to predict accurately according to experts (Mytthon et al. 
2007). 
According to Craven et al. (2012), the main problem with NETA is that the state and the 
persons who develop the rules (tax rates) do not know what is the optimal tax rate, what is the 
tax rate that will bring the market into equilibrium. In their opinion the private sector offers 
much better solutions for obesity as an externality (fitness clubs, food producers promoting a 
healthy lifestyle). 
According to Allais et al. (2010), manufacturers have two options of responding if NETA is 
levied on their goods: 1.) They change nutrient quality, by which they produce their goods at 
lower material costs, so that the impact of the tax should not be strongly reflected in the gross 
consumer prices and thus sales should not plummet. 2.) They change the ingredients of their 
products, the earlier ones get replaced by more expensive ingredients, they change technology 
- which might make the product "healthier", but probably also more expensive, therefore 
persons with lower income may not afford them. This could lead to the establishment of 
inequalities in nutrient value at social level, depending on what goods the individual income 
groups can afford. 
In the case of NETA it means a clear methodological difficulty, owing to the mixed nutrient 
needs of the human body, that not the consumption, rather the overconsumption of these 
nutrients should be penalized (Leicester – Windmeijer 2004). 
Based on Stone (2013) and Muriel (2008), one of the big mistakes of taxes similar to NETA, 
i.e. the so-called “sin taxes” is that they mainly afflict the poorer social classes, which does 
not comply with the principle of equitable taxation, as outlined by Bánfi (2014). In West 
Europe a strong correlation has been registered between obesity and poverty. Persons with 
low income are much more likely to be obese, which may partly indicate that cheaper 
products purchased by the poor are also more unhealthy. At the same time, this makes the tax 
even more regressive: if poor persons consume more goods with higher sugar and fat content, 
this will impose a heavier tax burden on persons with lower income, not only because the 
ratio of food purchases is higher compared to their incomes, but also because they purchase 
unhealthy, taxable foods more frequently.  
 
4. The international experiences of the carbon tax 
4.1. The economic basis of the carbon tax 
Natural science presumes a relationship between the carbon dioxide contents of the 
atmosphere of the Earth and global warming. In any case, it can be experienced in practice 
that the average temperature characteristic of a particular geographical area keeps rising. This 
is coupled by various economic damages requiring prevention or handling - such as the loss of 
real properties owing to rising sea level, lower agricultural crop yields owing to the drier 
climate, agricultural infections and pests spread faster owing to the higher temperature, 
increased human hazards owing to the heat, etc. If natural science assumes correctly a 
relationship between CO2 emission and warming, then in economics the economic damages 
mentioned above will be the undesirable and adverse side effects of economic activities 
resulting in intensive CO2 emission (negative externalities). In this case the approach of Pigou 
for internalizing the externality is the carbon dioxide tax (also called green tax or carbon tax), 
while the approach of Coase is the carbon dioxide quota. From this point on we will be 
dealing with the approach of Pigou.  
The demand-modifying effect itself of the carbon tax is not simple or clear. As we have 
mentioned, Buchanan (1969), Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006), Nye (2008) wrote about the 
concentrated nature of the mineral oil sector and the international technological heterogeneity 
of the energy industry. The demand-reducing effect of the carbon tax also raises the problem 
of deadweight loss, on the other hand, it can be easily offset by the prevented damages. 
Furthermore, the replacement of the polluting technology enables in the long term the 
maintenance of demand in the quantity of energy production. In addition, in the medium-term 
the demand of the energy and transport sector shows no price elasticity, which reduces the 
effectiveness of the tax on the one hand and minimizes the deadweight loss on the other hand. 
Based on Kim et al. (2011), Cooper (1998), Pizer (1997), Pearce (1991), Nordhaus (2007), 
Gerlagh and Lise (2005), Bossier and Bréchet (1995) and Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006), 
the benefits and drawbacks of the carbon tax can be summarized as follows: it is a benefit of 
the tax that it specifies the price of pollution, encourages the polluters to reduce their per unit 
consumption and pollution, forces the producers and users to change their technologies, in 
order to retain their competitiveness in pricing, the existing institutes of taxation are available 
for the collection of the tax, furthermore, the tax burden of the economic participants adapts to 
the current status of the economic cycle. In contrast, drawbacks of the carbon tax include the 
costs of additional administration, increase of the total tax burden, owing to the price 
elasticity mentioned above, it is questionable whether the desired reduction of pollution can 
be accomplished, furthermore, this homogeneous tax affects the heterogeneous branch and 
technology level unevenly.  
Owing to the price inelasticity of demand mentioned above, the empirical analyses are sceptic 
about the motivating, influencing capability of green taxes. According to the research of Sipes 
and Mendelsohn (2001), Davis and Kilian (2009) and Kim et al. (2011), pollution hardly 
decreases as a result of taxes in the energy or transport branches. The fear of deteriorating 
competitiveness also makes practical application uncertain. As a new tax burden, pollution tax 
could make energy-intensive production more expensive, which results in the loss of 
international competitiveness. This is why Baranzini et al. (2000) and Zhang and Baranzini 
(2004) recommend that green taxes should be introduced as part of a tax reform, quasi 
replacing or reducing other taxes on production. 
 
4.2. Carbon tax in the European practice 
The green taxes were first applied by Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
and by the Netherlands, from the 1990s. Additional countries have joined this practice from 
the beginning of the 2000s (Baranzini et al. 2000). Concerning that, according to Barker et al. 
(2007) the problem occurred that those countries that do not apply green taxes deteriorate the 
efficiency of those who apply them, also at the level of the international community, since the 
polluting activities creep over to the tax-free countries. In fact, global warming can only be 
controlled at global level, since its side effects are negative externalities realized at 
international level. Therefore, in this case we have an international public good problem, as 
opposed to healthy eating, which burdens the national health funding systems, therefore 
increases social marginal cost only at national level. At the same time, probably because of 
the negligible tax rates applied, both Barker et al. (2007) and Zhao (2011) found a very weak 
connection between the tax burden and the above competition-distorting fears, as well as 
between the tax burden and the reduction of pollution. 
Every assessment of the European examples could only demonstrate a minimum connection 
between pollution reduction and green taxes. In fact, a significant reduction of CO 2 emission 
can be demonstrated, but it is not clear whether this occurred owing to the taxes or rather 
because of technological development. Floros and Vlachou (2005) assessed the carbon tax 
levied on the Greek processing industry and demonstrated that demand for energy itself is 
price inelastic. They could not separate significantly in this case, either, to what extent the 
drop in the emission of CO2 by 17.6% after the implementation of the tax was a consequence 
of the tax, and to what extent it was caused by technological change. Giblin and McNabola 
(2009) assessed the vehicle tax applied in Ireland, which is based on CO2 emission. They also 
arrived at the conclusion that the reduction of pollution was not forced by the tax, rather - as is 
implied by the analysis of Wissema and Dellink (2007) - the replacement of technologies and 
assets in the medium term. In France, in the case of the carbon tax incorporated into fuel 
prices once again it was not the decrease of consumption that was spectacular, rather, as was 
demonstrated by Bureau (2011), it resulted in a regressive withdrawal of income at the 
expense of households with a low income. Concerning the Norwegian carbon tax applied 
since 1991, we can use the analysis of Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) to get oriented concerning 
the effect of the tax. If we remove from the analysis the petrol industry which distorts the data 
significantly, in the case of non-oil extraction and non-oil processing branches the reduction 
in pollution was a mere 1.5%. The reason was partly the fact that in many branches 
exceptions were allowed in order to maintain competitiveness. Metal processing and the 
chemical industry were (not) taxed at a rate of 0%, which deteriorated the impact of the tax 
substantially, brought it down close to zero. 
The above examples show that it is not easy to introduce new types of taxes to a substantial 
extent in economies where the tax burden had amounted to 40 – 50% of the GDP, already 
prior to the introduction of the tax. The initial tax level restricts the efficient application of 
any tax incentives that are not exclusively aimed to generate revenues for the state budget. 
Precisely for that reason, it is recommended that green taxes - and other tax tools applied 
against negative externalities - should be introduced as part of a more complex practice. This 
was also argued in the proposal of Bossier and Bréchet (1995), i.e. that tax policymakers 
should also pay attention to how the total tax load of the economy and the individual 
participants of the economy are affected by the introduction of a new tax. If there is an 
intention not only to increase budget revenues, but also to introduce efficient tax incentives, 
then significant tax reduction is necessary at another point of the tax burden. This could cause 
problems because from a fiscal point of view it carries a risk if we reduce proven, large-
volume and easily collectible taxes, in order to introduce new and as yet untested taxes. In 
addition, efficiently functioning tax incentives actually jeopardize government revenues, since 
if we manage to reduce, for example, CO2 emission in practice (or sugar consumption, as 
mentioned in the previous example), then the tax base will also decrease, which means an 
automatic decrease in tax revenue as well. As has been mentioned, in such cases the two tax 
policy aims, i.e. the assurance of revenues and social motivation, are in conflict. As a classical 
example, the German practice is usually mentioned about the introduction of green taxes 
incorporated into the tax reform. Concerning that, Kohlhass (2000 and 2005), Bach et al. 
(2002), Knigge and Görlach (2005) present the effect the impact of the relevant tax law.5 The 
aim was to increase employment parallel with the reduction of pollution. Therefore, the social 
contribution burdens of employers were reduced while the tax burden of fuels and electricity 
were increased gradually. By this gradual tax restructuring a certain accumulated change was 
accomplished in both target figures (CO2 emission and employment) in the medium term. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have reviewed two not too simple cases for tax incentives applied against externalities. 
What is common in these two instances is that the increase of social marginal cost is related to 
the consumption of non-price elastic products, services (foodstuffs, energy). As a result, tax 
burden increases, but the desired effect, the mitigation of harmful side effects does not occur 
automatically.  
These two cases also demonstrated that in certain forms of taxation the intention of the 
legislator is not transparent for the consumers or the producers. The increase of taxes by a few 
units or a few percent does not carry a message in the case of increasing the VAT of 
foodstuffs or with fuels subject to complex taxation.  
The complexity of products, services in its self reduces the transparency and price effect of 
what percentage of sugar is contained in a particular product from among a high number of 
ingredients, or what is the ratio constituted by energy cost in the costs of a particular service.  
It is another important lesson that the demand – supply forces in the value chain of the target 
branch should be surveyed, to determine whether they will allow the price-increasing effect of 
the levied tax to play out. In this value chain it is also recommended to assess what are the 
opportunities for technological adaptation or a change in the behaviour of the 
consumers/producers. (E.g., it also serves the purpose if the producers reduce the sugar 
content of the product through product development processes, compared to the scenario 
when the consumers reduce their demands for goods containing sugar). 
It is recommended to assess what other, more rigid tools of economic policy can be applied in 
the case of non-price elastic demands, for which it is not the consumer who decides whether 
or not they are willing to pay more in order to maintain their level of consumption.  
The tax incentive should be significant in order to be considered a serious cost factor by the 
participants of the economy. In the case of economies in which the tax burden is high to start 
with, the social costs can and should only be internalized by new taxes if tax policy is able to 
alleviate other tax burdens meaningfully, so that in total it should not deteriorate the national 
cost competitiveness and should not impose a deterrence from economic activity. The reason 
is that such undesirable effects would jeopardize the tax base, and together with it, 
government revenues. 
In order to accomplish the incentive effect, it is not acceptable that market players should 
resort to alternative substitutions that do not result in the reduction of social marginal cost. In 
other words, the users, producers should not be able to bypass tax just because certain 
activities, products, services that are implicated in the creation of negative externalities are 
tax-free, enjoy an exempt status. 
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